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The defendant
needs special help
in understanding
basic rights and
responsibilities
mentally retarded defendant presents a dilemma for the criminal
justice practitioner.
4 The disability is diffij
cult to spot and isoften
confused with other conditions,
such as mental illness. The mentally
retarded defendant faces problems
at every stage of criminal proceedings; attorneys must address issues
of competence and criminal responsibility throughout these proceedings or face the spectre of
denied due process. The problem
can even be viewed as a life or death
matter; recently, several convicts
who have been identified as mentally retarded have been executed,
and the Supreme Court is considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to the execution of minors.
While the parallel to minors is not
perfect, characteristics found in
many individuals with mental retardation mirror the developmental
limitations of minors. Thus, the
Court's resolution of the case may
suggest a line of analysis applicable
to mentally retarded criminal defendants.Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724
P.2d (Okla. Cr. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987). It is, then,
crucial for lawyers to be able to recognize the mentally retarded defendant and to understand the
condition's impact on a case.
What is mental retardation?
The American Association on
Mental Retardation defines mental
retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period." American Association on Mental Deficiency, Classifi-
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cation in Mental Retardation 1 (H.
Grossman ed. 1983). This definition
has been universally accepted by
courts and legislatures.
As a practical matter, this means
that defendants with an IQ of 70 or
lower are mentally retarded (although the cutoff can be somewhat
higher, depending on the testing instrument used).
The impact of mental retardation
on the individual is substantial.
Among the characteristics frequently observed in persons who are
mentally retarded are limited communication skills, impaired memory, poor impulse control, and
difficulties with attention. In addition, the person with mental retardation lacks basic information that
the normal operation of the criminal
justice system presupposes of all
suspects and defendants. Compounding all of these problems is the
fact that people with mental retardation typically exert extraordinary
efforts to avoid any detection of their
disability, even by individuals seeking to assist them and even when
the recognition of the person's
handicap would be likely to result
in more favorable treatment. The
combination of these difficulties
makes it impossible for the criminal
courts to reach a fair and just result
if the nature of an individual's disability is not recognized.
The recent case of Limmie Arther
in South Carolina illustrates many of
these problems. Mr. Arther, whose
IQ has been measured as approximately 65, was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. When
asked by an interviewer to recite the
alphabet, he had to resort to singing
the nursery rhyme, and even then
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could proceed accurately no further than the letter G. He hummed
the rest of the tune. When asked
why a judge should understand
mental retardation, Arther answered, "I don't know that.... Most
of the words, you know, I had to
listen real close, because, you know,
I had to catch on one word, and the
next word I have to try to catch on
that, and I get lost very quick.... It's
not good though. It's bad. It's bad
to be retarded." Marcus, "Retarded
Killer's Sentence Fuels Death-Penalty Debate," The Washington Post,
June 23, 1987, at Al, Col. 1.
Several misconceptions about
mental retardation are commonly
encountered in the criminal justice
system. The first is that anyone with
an IQ below average is mentally retarded. Part of this misunderstanding may derive from the fact that in
an earlier era, persons with IQ scores
between 70 and 85 were referred to
by mental health professionals as
"borderline retarded." This classification has been abandoned by the
field, and individuals who function
at this level are no longer considered to be mentally retarded.
As a corrollary, many of those
people unfamiliar with the condition believe that an individual who
is only "mildly" mentally retarded is
not very seriously disabled, and requires no special attention from the
criminal justice system. The professional classification system does divide mentally retarded persons into
four categories: mild, moderate, severe, and profound, but this terminology does not support the
conclusion that a "mildly" retarded
individual has only a minimal disability. As we have written elsewhere, "Judges and other criminal
justice personnel unfamiliar with this
classification scheme may find the
labels of 'mild' and 'moderate' to be
euphemistic descriptions of individuals at those levels of disability." Ellis and Luckasson, "Mentally
Retarded Criminal Defendants," 53
George Washington Law Review 414,
423 (1985).
Every person with mental retardation has a substantial disability. As
an expert witness testified in a re-

cent capital case in South Carolina,
to minimize the effect of "mild"
mental retardation is the equivalent
of saying that an amputee who has
lost only one limb is "mildly amputated."
Finally, many lawyers and judges
confuse mental retardation with
mental illness. Mental illness is a diverse group of disorders of emotion
and thought processes. Mental retardation, by contrast, is primarily a
substantial reduction in the disabled individual's ability to learn.
The confusion of these two conditions often leads criminal justice
personnel to seek evaluation or
treatment of an individual who is retarded from a mental health professional, such as a psychiatrist. Most
mental health professionals have little or no training or experience with
people with mental retardation. Referring a mentally retarded defendant to such an inappropriate
professional invites a misleading
evaluation and fruitless "treatment."
Getting help
This is not to suggest that mental
retardation is extraordinarily diffcult
for competent experts to identify or
address. Qualified mental retardation professionals can determine
whether an individual is mentally
retarded with less ambiguity than
the courts often encounter when
mental health experts disagree
about a diagnosis of mental illness.
And, although mental retardation is
a permanent condition that cannot
be "cured," some of the specific effects of the disability can often be
overcome by special education or
other forms of habilitation by qualified professionals. The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
refer to the professional training of
mental retardation professionals as
well as to their roles as scientists,
evaluators, consultants and habilitators. Standard 7-1.1. The Standards stress the critical nature of
professional training in the field of
mental retardation, and suggest the
wide range of professional disciplines that might prove important in
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individual cases. "Mental retardation professionals are individuals
who have undergone extensive,
formal post-graduate education and
training in identifying specific functional deficits or habilitation needs
of persons with mental retardation
or a developmental disability. They
include special education teachers,
speech and language pathologists,
audiologists, physical therapists, as
well as those psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical social workers, psychiatric nurses, and other mental
health professionals who have received the necessary education and
training in mental retardation matters. Mental retardation professionals must be licensed or certified to
practice if licensure or certification
is required." Standard 7-1.1 commentary at 6-7.
Competence
The disabilities of suspects and
defendants with mental retardation
raise questions about individual
competence at several stages of the
criminal process. The individual may
not understand the situation in
which he finds himself and may not
be able to give reasonable assistance to counsel.
The most familiar setting in which
competence arises is the competence to stand trial. It has long been
recognized that some persons with
mental retardation may not meet the
competence requirements of Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Nevertheless, it is increasingly acknowledged that while competence to stand trial may be raised
too frequently for mentally ill defendants, the problem is recognized
and raised too seldom for defendants who may be mentally retarded. The current status of forensic
evaluation of competence to stand
trial reflects this problem. Several
assessment instruments exist which
are designed for mentally ill defendants, but only one instrument, currently in development, is specifically
designed for defendants with mental retardation. The forensic evaluator for a defendant with mental
retardation will generally administer
tests different from those found in
Winter 1988

the typical mental illness test battery. If a test is included that was not
designed for use with people who
have mental retardation, great care
must be taken to point out its limitations for this defendant.
Far too often, even when the possibility that a mentally retarded defendant is incompetent is raised, he
or she is committed for "treatment"
at a mental health facility. It should
come as no surprise that when a
person with mental retardation is
given treatment designed to alleviate mental illness, the retarded individual does not magically become
competent to stand trial.
Paradoxically, the prognosis for
effecting competence in a defendant whose incompetence results
from mental retardation may be
particularly hopeful if appropriate
professionals are employed. Contrary to the expectations of many

courts, it may be easier to effect
competence to stand trial in a defendant with mental retardation than
it is to "restore" a psychotic individual to competence. The key is the
willingness of the court system to
make use of the expertise of special
educators and other qualified mental retardation professionals. It will
often be possible for them to teach
the retarded individual those things
he needs to know in order to understand the proceedings and assist
counsel.
Issues of competence may also
arise in other contexts. One is the
person's ability to waive Miranda
rights and make a confession or
statement that can be used at trial.
When law enforcement officers accept such statements without valid
waiver, they may jeopardize subsequent prosecution. If the defen(Continued on page 45)
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tance of responsibility," a prison
term would still be presumed for
frauds involving more than $10,000.
Moreover, "a defendant who enters
a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction. . . as a matter of
right." Thus, the risk or length of a
prison term is not likely to decrease
with a guilty plea. With this decrease in the perceived value of the
guilty plea, more white-collar defendants may opt to take their
charges to trial. (Theoretically at
least, the "acceptance of responsibility" credit is to be given "without
regard to whether [the] conviction
is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt.")
The Sentencing Commission in-

terprets Section 235 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act as
permitting a sentencing judge to use
the guidelines as of the effective
date, regardless of when the crime
was committed. Because of possible ex post facto problems, however, the Sentencing Commission
has submitted proposed legislation
to Congress that would permit application of the guidelines only to
crimes committed after the effective date.
Even if the effective date of the
guidelines has been (as the Commission desired) delayed for nine
months, judges will be asked to use
the guidelines in the interim and to
report any problems or discrepan-
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(Continued from page 15)

dant's disability is not detected by
the time of the trial itself, the individual may be convicted on the basis of improper evidence.
Another context in which questions about competence arise isthe
plea bargaining process. Serious injustice may result if an incompetent
mentally retarded defendant's guilty
plea is accepted. If the handicapped individual succeeds in
masking his disability, there may not
be anybody in the process with an
incentive and opportunity to review
whether the defendant really understands the nature and consequences of the bargain.
Criminal responsibility
The defense of insanity (or, in the
terms of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, "mental nonresponsibility") has always been formulated to include individuals with
mental "defects." Yet the defense
is raised much less frequently in
cases involving mental retardation
than in cases of mental illness. There
is reason to believe that this is beginning to change.
Lawyers and mental retardation
professionals are increasingly recognizing the extent to which a mentally retarded individual's handicap
may have reduced his understanding of the world and of the conseWinter 1988
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quences of his actions. This may
meet the requirements of the insanity defense's cogitive prong-that
the individual did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct.
The defense is available to people with mental retardation regardless of which formulation a particular
jurisdiction had adopted. Some
mentally retarded defendants, however, may be particularly disadvantaged by the recent abandonment
of the defense's volitional prong, in
federal law and in some states, shifting from the American Law Institute's test to a modified version of
the M'Naghten test. Defendants
with substantial problems of impulsivity, or poor impulse control,
whether resulting from their mental
retardation or from the way the individuals have been treated in the
past, may present especially persuasive cases concerning their inability
to conform their conduct to the
law's requirements.
Problems also arise in those jurisdictions that have adopted "guilty
but mentally ill" (GBMI) statutes.
Typically, these statutes have been
drafted to include defendants with
mental retardation within their scope, but the provisions regarding
evaluation of the defendant's mental condition and for disposition following conviction all focus

cies to the Sentencing Commission.
If the guidelines are implemented,
white-collar defendants may face
the spectre of lengthy prison terms
more than ever before.

It is important for the practitioner
to understand that white-collar investigations are no longer demure,
sometimes courtly exchanges between polite adversaries. They
rather frequently involve the application of some of the harshest and
more intrusive investigative techniques which the criminal justice
system makes available to law enforcement and prosecution offiC)
cials.
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exclusively on mental illness.

Noncapital sentencing
it has long been recognized that
even where a defendant's mental
illness or mental retardation is insufficient to warrant an acquittal by
reason of insanity, it may nevertheless constitute a valid ground for
mitigating the punishment imposed. This principle is reflected in
ABA Criminal Justice Standard 7-9.3,
which provides that "[e]vidence of
mental illness or mental retardation
should be considered as a possible
mitigating factor in sentencing a
convicted offender."
Despite this consensus, the
United States Sentencing Commission failed to permit consideration
of mental disability as a mitigating
circumstance in many cases. The
commission's new guidelines would
allow courts to consider "significantly reduced mental capacity" as
a possibly mitigating factor, but only
for nonviolent offenses. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing
Guidelines and Policy Statements
'5K2.13 (April 13, 1987). This unprecedented limitation, which the
commission has not attempted to
justify in commentary, apparently
means that if a defendant's mental
retardation or mental illness falls
short of constituting a complete de-
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fense to the charge of a violent
crime, it cannot even be considered
by the court in determining an appropriate sentence for the disabled
offender. This limitation, which was
opposed by testimony from the ABA
and from mental retardation professional organizations, is likely to be
the subject of extensive debate in
the coming months.
The death penalty
Jurisdictions that have adopted
capital punishment must face two
important issues regarding mentally
retarded defendants charged with
capital crimes. One is the possibility
that the defendant's mental disability renders him incompetent to be
executed. See generally, Ward,
"Competence for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry," 14
Florida State University Law Review
35 (1986). The United States Supreme Court recently held that it violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment to execute a currently
incompetent individual. Ford v.
Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
Although the Ford case dealt with
an inmate who was mentally ill (or,
as the Court referred to him, "insane"), the ruling clearly applies to
any incompetent individual, regardless of the nature of his particular
disability. In reformulating their laws
to meet the new procedural requirements of Ford, states should
take care to describe both mentally
ill and mentally retarded convicts as
within the law's scope, and should

mandate the use of qualified mental
retardation professionals to evaluate those convicts whose possible
incompetence may be a result of
mental retardation. Meanwhile, defense counsel can persuasively argue that Ford applies in any case of
mental incompetence, and that the
etiology of the incompetence,
whether it is caused by mental illness or mental retardation, is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment
challenge.
The broader question is whether
it is ever permissible, under the
Eighth Amendment and equivalent
provisions of state constitutions, to
execute a person with mental retardation. Despite the fact that some
state statutes fail to list mental disability as a mitigating circumstance,
it is unconstitutional to deny a defendant the opportunity to present
any relevant information that may be
mitigating. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (1986). As in
noncapital cases, mental retardation will always be a relevant mitigating factor.
But the system under which the
capital sentencing authority considers possible factors in mitigation may
be insufficient to address the effect
of a defendant's mental retardation
on his offense. Since the decision
whether a particular individual
should be executed must always rest
on the defendant's "blameworthiness" and "personal responsibility
and moral guilt," Booth v. Maryland,
107 S.Ct. 2529, 2533-34 (1987), a
strong argument can be made that
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capital punishment should be categorically precluded when the defendant is mentally retarded.
Although the effect of some retarded defendant's disabilities will not
be sufficient to entitle them to an
acquittal on grounds of mental nonresponsibility, the reduced understanding of all mentally retarded
individuals about the consequences
of human actions supports the conclusion that they never have the extraordinary "blameworthiness" that
would justify selection as the extraordinarily exceptional case that
arguably merits the death penalty.
These considerations led the Association for Retarded Citizens and the
American Association on Mental
Retardation to call for a ban on the
death sentence or execution of any
mentally retarded person.
The criminal justice system's
awareness of defendants with mental retardation is gradually improving. Lawyers and judges must
become increasingly sophisticated
in their understanding of this disability and its effects if they are to do
justice in cases involving mentally
retarded defendants. Defense
counsel must improve their ability
to identify mental retardation and
obtain assistance from properly
qualified professional experts in the
field of mental retardation. Counsel
also has an obligation to make appropriate legal arguments to require
the criminal justice system to take
fairly into account the special disabilities and circumstances of defendants with mental retardation. Cj
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(Continued from inside front cover)

mer" and a "walk" one that attempts realistically to protect society
from further crimes by a convicted
offender.
Even for those that believe in a
"tougher" criminal justice system,
there surely must be a reasonable
limit to the need for harshness. Is a
system that istwice as "tough," and
more than twice as expensive, now
"tough enough?" One would expect that the pressure for longer
sentences would have begun to
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ebb. Instead, the momentum for the
expanded use of imprisonment
continues unabated. Despite evidence that federal criminal sentences had increased in severity by
32 percent during the previous
seven years, last year, Congress enacted sweeping new mandatory
minimum sentences for federal drug
crimes. And this Spring, the United
States Sentencing Commission produced a set of federal sentencing
guidelines which, if followed by the

federal judiciary, will increase, by
the Commission's own estimates,
federal prison populations by 71 to
88 percent in five years. The Commission acknowledges that one of
its principal objectives was to reduce the number of convicted federal offenders who did not receive
a prison sentence.
Policy on criminal sentences is
made in this country by officials in
all three branches of government:
governors and correctional depart-
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